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STATEMENT OF JURISDTCTTON 
Final Judgment was entered on June 29, 2001 [Addendum ("Add.") B, Record on 
Appeal ("R.") 5037-39]. Plaintiff timely filed his notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court on July 17, 2001 (R. 5047-48) pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a) and UTAH CODE 
ANN. §-78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to this Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Whether in determining Plaintiff William Anthony Kraatz's ("Kraatz") 
damages the trial court erred in finding that the value of 100% of the stock of Defendant 
Heritage Imports ("Heritage") was worth $3.1 million, based upon Larry H. Miller's 
("Miller") testimony that he had purchased 60% of the stock for that amount. 
Standard of Review: Whether the challenged finding is "against the clear weight of 
the evidence" or such that "the appellate court otherwise [may reach] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is without adequate evidentiary support or is 
induced by an erroneous view of the law. Id. Appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the finding and then show why the finding was clearly erroneous. Saunders v. 
Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990), remanded on other grounds, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 
1991). The appellate court will presume a trial court's award of damages to be correct and 
will overturn it only if it is clearly erroneous with no reasonable support in the evidence. 
Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 896 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Citation to the Record Showing Preservation of the Issue: R. 5084-87. 
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in excluding from the calculation of 
Kraatz's damages, all benefits of his employment which were not expressly required by 
the employment agreement he signed, even though such benefits were allowed by the 
agreement and were actually enjoyed by him during his employment and provided to his 
successor. 
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions 
for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). 
Citation to the Record Showing Preservation of the Issue: R. 5073-84. 
Issue No. 3: Whether in calculating the profit bonus Kraatz would have earned had 
he not been wrongfully discharged, the trial court erred in refusing to allow adjustments 
of Heritage's reported profits in light of undisputedly excessive expenses paid to or for the 
benefit of Heritage's majority shareholder (Larry Miller), based on the court's 
interpretation of language in the employment contract. 
Standard of Review: Where a court's interpretation of an employment contract 
presents a question of law, the appellate court shall review the court's conclusions for 
correctness, affording no deference. Glick v. Holden, 889 P.2d 1389, 1392 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
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Citation to the Record Showing Preservation of the Rsne- R. 5071-73. 
Issue No. 4: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to award Kraatz, as part of 
his damages, all of the expert witness fees he incurred and all of the deposition costs he 
incurred, given the language of the employment agreement entitling him to all costs and 
expenses as the prevailing party at trial. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of costs awardable under a 
contract presents a question of law, which the appellate court shall review for correctness, 
affording no deference to the trial court. Chase v. Scott, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 404, t 10, 
437 Utah Adv. Rep. 20. 
Citation to the Record Showing Preservation of the Issue: R. 5087-89. 
Issue No. 5: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to award pre-judgment interest 
on some of Kraatz's damages, and his attorney fees and costs. 
Standard of Review: Entitlement to pre-judgment interest is a question of law that 
the appellate court reviews for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. Lefavi 
v. Bertoch, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 5, 1 23, 994 P.2d 817. 
Citation to'the Record Showing Preservation of the Issue: R. 5089-98. 
Issue No. 6: Whether as to damages on which the trial court did not award pre-
judgment interest, the trial court erred in refusing to increase Kraatz's damage award by 
the Consumer Price Index in order to compensate Kraatz for the diminished value of 
United States currency between the time or times his damages arose and the time of 
judgment. 
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Standard of Review: This is an issue of law to be reviewed by the appellate court 
for correctness, affording the trial court no deference. Reliance Insurance Co., supra. 
Citation to the Record Showing Preservation of the Issue: R. 5098-99. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Kraatz for wrongful termination of a written five-year 
Employment Agreement (the "Contract), by his employer, Heritage. Kraatz asserted 
claims for breach of contract and related claims against Heritage and its officers (R. 1-41). 
After a bench trial ending on August 30, 1996, the trial court found in favor of 
Defendants, ruling that Heritage had terminated Kraatz for cause under the Contract (R. 
1681-1720). 
Kraatz appealed, challenging many of the trial court's findings as clearly erroneous. 
This Court reversed (1999 Utah Ct. App. 70) and remanded the case to the trial court with 
instructions to determine the amount of Kraatz's damages, along with attorney fees and 
costs as provided by the Contract. 
After remand, the parties briefed the issues of damages, attorney fees and costs, 
based on the evidence at trial, as supplemented (R. 5060). Kraatz claimed total damages, 
attorney fees and costs of $1,073,437.68, consisting of $553,485.00 in lost wages and 
benefits, $432,941.36 in attorney fees, $48,186.26 in expert witness fees, and $38,825.06 
in costs. In addition, Kraatz claimed $440,840.80 in pre-judgment interest, for a total 
claim of $1,514,278.48. The trial court took additional evidence, heard argument and 
entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (Add. A, R. 4974-5020) and 
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Judgment (Add. B, R. 5037-39), awarding Kraatz $643,816.99, consisting of damages for 
lost wages and benefits of $124,118.56, pre-judgment interest thereon of $21,828.67 plus 
$9.35 per day until entry of Judgment, attorney fees of $432,941.36, expert witness fees 
of $35,502.09, and costs of $29,155.16. 
The $124,118.56 award for lost wages and benefits consisted of the following (Add. 
A, R. 5014): 
Base Salary $35,255.70 
Annual Fixed Bonus 12,000.00 
Profit Bonus Credit (/.e., net offset) (46,082.28) 
Demonstrator Auto 15,951.03 
Health Insurance Benefits 16,994.11 
Stock Appreciation 90,000.00 
In determining Kraatz's damages, the trial court, as a matter of law, disallowed any 
recovery for compensation or benefits Kraatz enjoyed as an employee of Heritage which 
were not expressly required by the Contract (Add A, R. 5001). Thus, the trial court 
rejected, as a matter of law, the following consequential damages claimed by Kraatz in the 
following amounts (based on the value of each during the remaining term of the Contract) 
(Add. A, R. 5002, 5017, 5041-44, 5073-84, Ex. 302).l 
Category Amount 
401 (k) Retirement Contributions $8,109.04 
Season tickets to the Utah Jazz 18,898.50 
Annual Christmas bonuses 1,500.00 
Second home (St. George) Reimbursement 2,210.53 
'Excerpts of Plaintiff's Ex. 302 and 302(c) are attached hereto as Add. D and E. 
respectively. 
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Warranty income 119,856.51 
Private (non-business) use of Sports Mall membership 6,187.50 
The trial court also rejected, as a matter of contract interpretation, Kraatz's claims 
to the following benefits expressly required by the Contract: 
1. A profit bonus in the amount of $107,952.03 [before mitigation, $26,894.34 
after mitigation (Ex. 302) based on the earnings of Heritage after his discharge (Add. A, 
R. 4997-98; R. 5071); and 
2. The value of the use of a membership at the Hidden Valley Country Club in 
the amount of $10,863.00 (Add. A, R. 4997-99, R. 5075, Ex. 302). 
The trial court also rejected, on factual grounds, Kraatz's claims to: 
1. $285,000.00 of "stock appreciation" rights (instead, awarding $90,000.00 
on this claim) (Add. A, R. 4999-5001, R. 5087); and 
2. Unreimbursed health care costs for 1991 in the amount of $3,484.26 (Add. 
A, R. 4998-99). 
The trial court also rejected, as a matter of law, Kraatz's claims to $9,369.90 in 
deposition costs (Add. A, R. 5003, 5019, 4318-20, 4955); and $12,684.17 in expert 
witness fees (Messrs. Schmidt and Hall) (Add. A, R. 5002-03, 5018, 4231, 4956). 
The trial court further rejected, as a matter of law, Kraatz's claim to prejudgment 
interest on "Stock Appreciation" damages [which would be $79,200.00 in interest on the 
$90,000.00 the trial court awarded or $208,245.20 (R. 4230) in interest on the 
$285,000.00 Kraatz sought], on the attorney fee award ($79,020.51 in interest) (R. 
-6-
4927-29; 4966), and on the expert fees, deposition and other litigation expenses Kraatz 
claimed ($15,671.20 in interest) (R. 4315, see also Add. A, R. 5003-04, 5014-15). 
The trial court also rejected Kraatz's contention (R. 5098-99) that his damages on 
which pre-judgment interest was not awarded should be increased based on the increase 
in the Consumer Price Index, to compensate for the measurable loss in the value of the 
U.S. dollar over time (Add. A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Kraatz's damages arise out of Heritage's (n/k/a Larry H. Miller Honda) wrongful 
termination, on September 11, 1992, of his written employment Contract, pursuant to 
which Kraatz was promised employment for at least five years (through June 15, 1995), 
and substantial compensation. Under the Contract, Kraatz's compensation and benefits 
include (1) $8,000.00 per month, (2) a yearly bonus equal to $4,000.00 plus ten percent 
(10%) of the dealership's net profits in excess of $280,000.00, (3) two demonstrator 
automobiles (including insurance, maintenance and gasoline), (4) use of a Salt Lake Sports 
Mall family membership, (5) use of a Hidden Valley Country Club membership, (6) health 
insurance for Kraatz and his family, (7) reimbursement of non-covered healthcare costs 
incurred by Kraatz and his family, not to exceed $5,000.00 per year; (8) expenses related 
to Kraatz's relocation from St. George to Salt Lake City, and (9) "additional compensation 
within the discretion of Company" (Add. C, Ex. 38,11 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and Schedules A & 
C, R. 4063, 4067, 4071-72; R. 1759). 
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During Kraatz's employment, Heritage agreed to pay him substantial "additional 
compensation" over and above the first eight items specified in the Contract, such as 
contributions to a retirement plan (R. 1872-73), Christmas bonuses (R. 1865), participation 
in profits from the sale of automobile warranty contracts (R. 1873-74), season tickets to 
the Utah Jazz (R. 1872), and additional reimbursement of expenses associated with 
Kraatz's move from St. George to Salt Lake City (R. 1872, see also R. 1777, 1799-1807, 
1808, 1835-36, 1872-75). 
Under the Contract, Kraatz is also entitled to an amount equal to 15% of the value 
of the dealership over $2.5 million upon the termination of his employment without cause. 
{See, Add. C, Ex. 38 1 3.2 and Schedule B, R. 4063, 4068-70.) 
A. LOST WAGES AND BENEFITS. 
Mr. Bruce Wisan, CPA, presented to the trial court a detailed calculation 
summarizing the damages suffered by Kraatz, showing lost wages and benefit damages of 
$268,485.55, after mitigation from Kraatz's subsequent employment. (See, Ex. 302, R. 
4079.) Mr. Wisan's calculations were not challenged by Heritage. Indeed, Heritage's 
counsel advised the court that he had no objection to Mr. Wisan's calculations and urged 
Kraatz's counsel to forego foundational testimony from Kraatz, as to the bases for Mr. 
Wisan's opinion, on the grounds that it was unnecessary (R. 1808). 
Mr. Wisan's calculations consist of 13 categories of compensation, in the form of 
wages and benefits, Heritage owed to Kraatz. Nine categories are at issue on appeal as 
follows: 
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1. Profit Sharing. The Contract entitles Kraatz to receive 10% of the 
dealership's profits in excess of $280,000.00 per year [Add. C, Ex. 38, Sch. "A," 1 (b), 
R. 4067]: 
A yearly bonus equal to $4,000.00 plus 10 percent (10%) of 
the Dealership Net Profits in excess of $280,000.00 
determined in accordance with accounting practices acceptable 
to and used by company in reporting to American Honda, Inc., 
or such other accounting method as is mutually acceptable to 
both company and employee. 
Within 90 days after Kraatz was wrongfully discharged, O. Bryan Wilkinson 
("Wilkinson") agreed to sell his 60% stock ownership in Heritage to Miller and had no 
more influence over the dealership or its finances (R. 2086-87, 2210-13). In January 1993, 
Miller implemented his own management policies (R. 2419-20; Ex. 208, 333, R. 4078, 
4138). The corporate entity with which Kraatz had contracted did not change (R. 1026, 
Joint Pretrial Order). 
At trial, Mr. Wisan calculated that Kraatz was entitled, before mitigation, to 
$107,952.03 (Ex. 302) in lost income from his contractual right to share in the net profits 
of Heritage earned after his wrongful discharge. In making his calculation, Mr. Wisan 
made adjustments for two unreasonable expenses not directly related to the production of 
income. The reported profits were adjusted so as not to burden Kraatz with the price paid 
to Wilkinson for the stock purchased by Larry Miller (which Miller had arranged for 
Heritage to pay) (R. 2109-10; 2217; 2233, 2187-88; 4072) and undisputedly excessive 
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rents Miller caused Heritage to pay to himself as Heritage's landlord after he took over 
(Ex. 302 at Sch. A-1.2 and A-l.2-2, R. 2109-13, 2238; 4081). 
To show the effect each of the adjustments had on the calculation of Kraatz's 
damages, Mr. Wisan prepared Exhibits 327 and 328 (R. 4138-39). These exhibits showed 
that if the rent adjustment were not allowed it would decrease Kraatz's damages award by 
$20,073.33, and if the stock purchase adjustment were not allowed it would decrease 
Kraatz's award by an additional $54,362.83 (Ex. 327, 328). While Kraatz's right to share 
in Heritage's net profits was not disputed, the trial court rejected Mr. Wisan's calculation 
of those profits based on its interpretation of the above-quoted language of the Contract 
and the following rationale (Add. A, R. 4997-98): 
Plaintiff sought to adjust Heritage's accounting practices for 
portions of the purchase price and for the rent charged by 
Miller. (Ex. 302.) However, under the Agreement any profit 
bonus due Plaintiff is to be based on the "accounting practices 
acceptable to and used by Company in reporting to American 
Honda." As the Court of Appeals held on p. 2, of the Memo 
Decision, where the Agreement is unambiguous, "the parties' 
intentions must be determined solely from the language of the 
contract." There is no evidence American Honda ever objected 
to the accounting methods actually used by Heritage. While 
Plaintiff is willing to claim the benefits from Larry H. Miller's 
operation of the Dealership in the form of profits earned, he 
must also take any burdens in the form of Larry H. Miller's 
"accounting practices acceptable to and used by the Company 
in reporting to American Honda." 
2. Sports Mall Membership. Schedule A of the Contract states that Kraatz 
would receive as additional compensation: 
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Use of a Salt Lake Sports Mall family membership during the 
term of the agreement. . . . Employee shall be responsible for 
all charges relating to nonbusiness use of the membership. 
[Add. C, Ex. 38, Sch. A, 1 (d), R. 4067.] 
Wilkinson admitted that during Kraatz's employment, Wilkinson authorized 
Heritage to pay all of the Sports Mall dues and fees incurred by Kraatz and his family 
(regardless of nonbusiness use), and that this had become part of Kraatz's compensation 
(R. 1872-73). Nevertheless, the trial court disallowed any recovery by Kraatz for the loss 
of this benefit because the Contract, as signed, obligates Heritage to pay only for Sports 
Mall expenses "related to business use" (R. 4999). 
3. Country Club Membership. Schedule A of the Contract states that Kraatz 
would receive as additional compensation: 
Use of an equity membership in Hidden Valley Country Club 
commencing June 1, 1992, and continuing throughout the term 
of this agreement. . . . Employee shall be responsible for all 
charges related to nonbusiness use of the membership. 
[Add. C, Ex. 38, Sch. A, 1 (e), R. 4067.] 
At trial Heritage's counsel made much of the fact that Kraatz had not incurred any 
charges on the membership throughout the two years of his employment (R. 
1859)—apparently oblivious to the fact that Kraatz's entitlement to the membership did not 
accrue until June 1, 1992, and that the promised membership was never actually given him 
before he was fired approximately three months later (September 11, 1992) (R. 1859). 
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Mr. Wisan valued Kraatz's right to the Country Club membership based upon his 
conversations with Kraatz wherein Kraatz indicated that he would use the membership in 
the summer months to the extent of three golf trips per month (or, in other words, six golf 
rounds for Kraatz and his guest) (Ex. 312, Sch. A1.5.; R. 4085). Mr. Wisan contacted the 
Country Club to ascertain the cost of a membership and related expenses for the indicated 
usage and derived a value of $4,152.00 per year, for a total of $10,863.00 during the 
remaining term of the Contract (R. 2117; Ex. 302, Sch. A1.5. Mr. Wisan's methodology 
was not challenged at trial. The trial court nevertheless denied Kraatz any recovery for the 
loss of this benefit because (Add. A, R. 4999): 
Plaintiff admitted at trial that in [the] twenty-seven months he 
was General Manager, he did not use the Hidden Valley 
membership for business use (R. 1859). The Court of Appeals 
did not overturn these admissions, and therefore, there is no 
basis for recovery by Plaintiff. 
4. St. George Home Reimbursement. Schedule C of the Contract states that 
Kraatz would receive additional compensation consisting of reimbursement for leaving his 
home in St. George and moving to Salt Lake City as follows: 
Commencing on the date on which the new residence being 
constructed for Employee is available for occupancy, and 
continuing thereafter for a period of not to exceed six (6) 
months, duplicate housing expenses incurred by Employee 
prior to the sale of Employee's residence in St. George, Utah. 
During said period, Company shall reimburse Employee for 
the lesser of (a) Employee's house payment on the residence 
in St. George or (b) Employee's house payment on the new 
residence in the Salt Lake area. Employee shall be required to 
use all reasonable effort to effect the sale of Employee's St. 
George residence. House payment is defined as the payment of 
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monthly loan principal and interest and reserves for taxes and 
insurance for an employee owned residence. Company's 
obligation to reimburse Employee for those duplicate housing 
expenses shall terminate at the earlier to occur of (a) the 
expiration of said six month period, or (b) the sale of 
Employee's residence in St. George. 
(Add. C, Ex. 38, Sch. C, 1 6, R. 4071-72.) 
Thereafter, the Contract was modified in two ways with respect to this provision. 
First, Kraatz did not require Heritage to pay the entire monthly mortgage payment for the 
St. George property, but only the differential between the mortgage payment and the rental 
amount that Kraatz received from the property (R. 1767-69). Heritage, on the other hand, 
agreed that it would continue to pay this differential until the home was sold and would not 
limit its commitment to the six months following Kraatz's move to Salt Lake City (R. 
1872, Ex. 305). 
Heritage continued to pay Kraatz this differential, in the amount of $631.58 per 
month, only through September 1992, when Kraatz was discharged (Ex. 302). Kraatz 
finally sold the St. George home in December 1992, and therefore seeks recovery of only 
$2,210.53 on this item of compensation. 
The trial court, as a matter of law, refused to award Kraatz any damages for the loss 
of this and other benefits, with the following analysis (Add. A, R. 5001): 
Paragraph 3.2 of the Agreement provides "Employee may 
receive additional compensation within the discretion of 
Company for other services rendered or other duties as 
assigned by the Company and agreed to by Employee." (Ex. 
38.) (Emphasis added.) There is no basis to award Plaintiff 
additional compensation since he: 
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failed to demonstrate any evidence of further 
consideration given by him for any additional 
compensation or perks received during his 
employment. The use of Jazz tickets, payments 
for Plaintiffs daughter's tennis lessons, 
participation in service contract companies of 
Lariat and Ryan, retirement, Christmas bonus, 
or St. George home subsidy are not 
"compensation" under the Agreement. (Original 
CL B. l l ; See also, original CL B.4 & 12.) 
* * * 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that such consequential damages are 
precluded based upon: (1) lack of consideration given by Kraatz for such additional 
compensation (Add. A, R. 5002, 5009), (2) the parol evidence rule (Add. A, R. 5016-17), 
(3) that the loss of these benefits was not reasonably foreseeable (Add. A, R.5017), or (4) 
that the damages claimed were speculative (Add. A, R. 5017). 
5. Annual Christmas Bonuses. During Kraatz's employment he received, each 
Christmas, a bonus of $500.00 (R. 1865; Ex. 302). Nevertheless, the trial court refused 
to award Kraatz any damages for the loss of this benefit under the analysis quoted and 
discussed above. 
6. Jazz Tickets. Wilkinson admitted at trial that season tickets to the Utah Jazz 
basketball games had become part of Kraatz's compensation (R. 1872). During the 
1991-92 season, Kraatz received four season tickets which he was free to use as he wished 
(R. 2144-46). 
Mr. Wisan calculated the value of these tickets to Kraatz, based on the actual cost 
of the tickets as reported by the front office of the Utah Jazz as $18,898.50 for the 
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remaining term of the Contract (Ex. 302 at Sch. C). There is no evidence in the record to 
the contrary. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to award Kraatz any damages for the loss 
of this benefit under the analysis quoted and discussed above. 
7. Retirement Contributions. During the entire period of Kraatz's employment 
at Heritage, he participated in the company's 401-k retirement plan, pursuant to which the 
company matched his contribution up to 2% of his annual compensation (R. 1865 1872-73; 
Ex. 302 at Sch. D). 
Under Heritage's 401-k plan each employee was required to save 2% of his income 
and the company was required to match that amount (Ex. 302 at Sch. D). In addition, 
Heritage had discretion to make additional contributions over and above the minimum 
required by the plan. Id. However, Mr. Wisan's calculation was based on a loss to Kraatz 
of only the minimum 2% contribution totaling $8,109.04. Id. Mr. Wisan's methodology 
in valuing this element of damage was not challenged by any evidence at trial. 
Nevertheless, the trial court refused to award damages arising out of the loss of this benefit 
under the analysis quoted and discussed above. 
8. Participation in Warranty Income. During Kraatz's employment at Heritage, 
he participated in the income from the sale of warranty contracts (R. 1872-75). This was 
an important part of his compensation (R. 1806-07, Ex. 302). Mark Schmitz, Ph.D.. 
testified that it was common practice in the industry to compensate general managers by 
allowing them to participate in such income (R. 2434). 
-15-
Jeff Wilkinson (Bry Wilkinson's son and Kraatz's successor as General Manager 
of Heritage) also participated in income derived from the sale of warranty contracts (also 
referred to as "service contracts") (Ex. 302(c), R. 4110). Jeff Wilkinson also received 
other types of compensation as Kraatz's successor that Kraatz did not receive during his 
employment, such as $15.00 per car sold and bonuses based on leases sold. (Id.) 
Mr. Wisan calculated this category of damages based on Heritage's actual sales of 
vehicles to be $119,856.51 (Ex. 302 at Sch. F). Mr. Wisan's method of calculating this 
item of damage was not challenged by any evidence introduced at trial. Nevertheless, the 
trial court refused to award damages arising from the loss of this benefit, as quoted and 
discussed above. 
9. Unreimbursed Health Care Costs. Under paragraph (f) of Schedule A of the 
Contract (Add. C), Kraatz was promised that he would be reimbursed up to $5,000.00 in 
medical expenses not covered by the company-provided health insurance policy. Kraatz's 
claim for $3,484.26 of such expenses incurred in the calendar year prior to his discharge 
(1991) were denied by the trial court for the stated reason that (Add. A, R. 4999): 
In claiming insurance benefits, Plaintiff is ignoring his oral 
agreement with Bry Wilkinson to forego noncovered health 
reimbursements because the company was unprofitable (R. 
1837-38). 
The actual transcript of Kraatz's testimony the trial court cited, however, states as 
follows (R. 1837-38): 
Q So you agreed to postpone it? 
A I did. 
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Q Did you agree to just waive it, not ask for it? 
A No/ 
Q And you're asking for those now? 
A Yes. 
The trial court's finding is simply an erroneous observation of what Kraatz actually 
said. 
10. Summary of Lost Wages and Benefits. Mr. Wisan's unrefuted calculations 
(Ex. 302) show that Kraatz has suffered damages in the nature of unpaid wages and 
benefits, after mitigation, equal to $268,485.55. This figure is corroborated by comparison 
of Kraatz's post-Heritage wages and benefits with the wages and benefits received for the 
same period of time by Jeff Wilkinson, a much less experienced manager, who took 
Kraatz's place as general manager at Heritage. That comparison shows that during the 
remainder of the term of Kraatz's Contract, Jeff Wilkinson made $208,514.37 more as 
Kraatz's successor than Kraatz made at his subsequent employment (Ex. 302, Sch. K). 
As of September 1992, Kraatz was 47 years old (R. 1747) and Jeff Wilkinson was 
27 years old (R. 1793). Jeff Wilkinson had never been a general manager before and had 
not yet been fully trained for that position at the time of Kraatz's wrongful discharge (R. 
2380-81, 2385-86). Kraatz, on the other hand, had over 25 years of experience in the auto 
industry, had owned his own dealership (R. 1746-48) and enjoyed a good reputation as a 
general manager in the auto industry (Testimony of Larry Miller, R. 2091-92). 
Miller admitted at trial that he would have retained Kraatz as general manager if it 
had been up to him (R. 2090-91) and that Kraatz would have been offered a 10% 
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shareholder interest in Heritage (R. 2087). Within one month before Kraatz was 
discharged, he received a raise (which is not included in his damages calculation) (R. 
1833). There was no testimony presented by anyone at trial that the wages and benefits 
Kraatz had been receiving during his employment would not have continued if he had 
remained as general manager at Heritage. 
Jeff Wilkinson testified that some of the income he received from Heritage in the 
form of warranty income and profit sharing came to him because he was a shareholder of 
Heritage as opposed to an employee (R. 2405). However, in comparing Kraatz's income 
from his subsequent employment, with Jeff Wilkinson's income as Kraatz's successor, Mr. 
Wisan did not include any dividend income for Jeff Wilkinson, but only W-2 income as 
reflected in Jeff Wilkinson's pay stubs and W-2 forms issued by Heritage reflecting wages, 
tips and other compensation [Ex. 302, Sch. K and R. 4110-14; see also Ex. 302(c), Add. 
E, R. 4110]. 
B. FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THE VALUE OF HERITAGE'S STOCK OVER $2.5 
MILLION. 
Schedule B of the Contract gives Kraatz the right to receive 15% of the value of 
Heritage's stock over $2.5 million at the time his employment was terminated (Add. C, 
Ex. 38). The trial court found the value of 100% of Heritage stock to be only 
$3,100,000.00 and thus awarded Kraatz only $90,000.00 in damages which is 15 % of the 
difference between $2.5 million and $3.1 million (Add. A, R. 5001). 
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In its written findings, the trial court justified its finding of value by erroneously 
observing that (Add. A, R. 5001): 
Larry H. Miller testified he purchased the dealership for 
between 3 and 3.1 million dollars (R. 2216-22). Based upon 
Larry H. Miller's valuation, plaintiff is entitled to stock 
appreciation of $90,000 (calculated as $3,100,000 less 
$2,500,000 = $600,000 x 15% = $90,000.00). 
Miller testified, however, that he purchased only 60% of the stock of Heritage for 
between $3,000,000.00 and $3,100,000.00 (R. 2216). This fact was never disputed at 
trial. The trial court's finding is simply an erroneous observation of what Miller actually 
said. 
C. ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES. 
The Contract entitles Kraatz to recover: 
All expenses and costs incurred by [Kraatz] in enforcing the 
terms [of the Contract], including but not limited to, costs, 
reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and/or 
deposition costs whether incurred through legal action or 
otherwise and whether incurred before or after judgment. 
(See Ex. 38, 1 5.6 of the Contract, Add. C, R. 4065.) 
1. Attorney Fees. Plaintiff does not appeal from the amount of attorney fees the 
district court awarded him. 
2. Deposition Costs and Witness Fees (other than expert witness fees). The trial 
court disallowed $9,269.90 in deposition costs and witness fees for any witnesses or 
depositions not actually utilized at trial (Add. A, R. 5003, 5019; R. 4955). Kraatz's 
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request for these costs and expenses was supported by the unrebutted Affidavit of Michael 
N. Zundel (R. 5102), wherein Mr. Zundel explained that: 
25. Some specifically identifiable factors giving rise 
to the extensive services provided to Kraatz through trial are: 
(a) Heritage's failure to cooperate during the discovery phase 
of this case as evidenced by this Court's Order compelling 
discovery dated June 2, 1993; (b) the multitude of groundless 
accusations made by Heritage against Kraatz in conclusory and 
foundationless fashion, with hope of establishing "cause" for 
discharging Kraatz, which required Kraatz's counsel to ferret 
out the truth regarding each of said allegations, to the extent 
there was any, and organize the evidence so as to place the 
facts in proper context, showing all such allegations to have 
been utterly foundationless, pretextual, petty, immaterial or 
irrelevant; (c) the aggressiveness of Heritage's attack upon the 
enforceability of the contract, as written, pursuant to which 
Kraatz was employed, e.g., Heritage's attempt to equate the 
contract's use of the term "refusal" with "failure;" and (d) the 
fact that almost all of the available witnesses were biased 
against Kraatz because they were: (i) part of the Wilkinson 
family, (ii) still employed by Defendant Heritage at the time of 
trial, or (iii) business associates of Larry Miller, the majority 
stockholder of the Defendant. 
* * * 
36. The extensive preparation evidenced by the 
billing records attached hereto allowed Plaintiff's counsel to 
know, near the end of the fourth day of trial, that Kraatz's case 
had been established by the evidence and that further evidence 
was not necessary. Thus Kraatz's counsel rested and did not 
call additional unnecessary witnesses. 
37. I have reviewed the amounts and categories of 
costs and expenses advanced by the Firm in this case and I am 
of the opinion that they are proper, reasonable and were 
necessarily incurred for the following reasons: 
* * * 
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f. The category of "Deposition and 
Witness Fees" contains those charges incident to 
obtaining testimony of numerous witnesses or 
potential witnesses identified by Defendants in 
response to Plaintiffs interrogatories. All of the 
numerous depositions taken prior to trial were 
necessary to either ascertain the alleged factual 
basis of Heritage's allegations against Kraatz or 
to secure foundation for Kraatz's damage claims, 
often from out of state witnesses. Heritage 
complains in its Trial Brief Re: Attorney Fees 
that "22 volumes of depositions" were taken in 
this case, but Defendants identified, in their 
Second Amended Answer to Plaintiffs 
Interrogatories, 30 people who had information 
relevant to this case. Many of the witnesses 
deposed were persons identified by Heritage as 
persons having knowledge of Kraatz's alleged 
malfeasance and were friendly to Heritage. 
Under such circumstances, there is no cause for 
Heritage to complain about the number of 
depositions taken in this case. 
3. Expert Witness Fees. The trial court disallowed expert witness fees for 
Walter Hall in the amount of $10,384.17, and for Kent Schmidt in the amount of 
$2,300.00 (R. 4231), because they did not testify at trial, were, in the court's opinion, 
"unnecessary" and did not provide unique information to Kraatz (Add. A, R. 5002-03, 
5018, R. 4957). The necessity of these experts to the development of Kraatz's case was 
supported by the Affidavit of Mr. Zundel (R. 5102), wherein he explained that he 
personally communicated with and hired Kent Schmidt and Walter Hall and that the 
assistance of each of those experts was necessary and helpful in developing his 
understanding of the issues involved in the appraisal and damages calculation process and 
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the evidence necessary to establish Kraatz's case (R. 5106). Mr. Zundel's Affidavit was 
unrebutted by any other evidence. 
4. Pre-judgment Interest. 
a. Interest on Lost Wages and Benefits. Beginning September 11, 1992, 
when Kraatz was discharged, and at the end of each month thereafter for the remainder of 
the contract term,' the following elements of Kraatz's damages were fixed as of the end of 
each month and measurable by facts and figures with a high degree of certainty (in addition 
to the amounts on which the district court awarded pre-judgment interest) (Ex. 302): 
i. uninsured health care costs incurred by Kraatz for the year of 
1991 in the amount of $3,484.26; 
ii. value of a family membership to the Sports Mall in the amount 
of $187.50 per month; 
iii. annual Christmas bonus of $500.00 per year; 
iv. the $18,898.04 value of four season tickets for three seasons 
to the Utah Jazz; 
v. the $8,109.04 value of contributions to Heritage's retirement 
plan on behalf of Kraatz; 
vi. the $2,210.53 difference between the monthly mortgage 
payments made on Kraatz's St. George home and the rent received from the tenants 
of the home for the period September 1992 through December 1992; 
-22-
vii. the $119,856.57 income to Kraatz for the sale of warranty 
contracts based on Heritage's actual sales of cars during the remaining term of the 
Contract and the historical rates of warranties sold; and 
viii. 10% of Heritage's total profits (as adjusted for excess rent and 
the cost of Miller's buyout of Wilkinson) over $280,000.00 per year, or (before 
mitigation) $3,708.63, $58,779.77 and $45,463.68 for each ofthe years 1993, 1994 
and 1995, respectively. 
Mr. Wisan, plaintiff's expert, calculated pre-judgment interest on the above lost 
wages and benefits on a month-by-month or year-by-year basis to be $150,455.44 through 
December 31, 1999, plus $73.56 per day thereafter until entry of judgment (R. 4229). 
b. Interest on Stock Appreciation Right. Although the value of Heritage 
as of September 11, 1992 was $4.4 million, a minimum value of $4.2 million was 
measured by facts and figures as of a later point in time (i.e., the December 1992 sale to 
Miller) (R. 2199-2002; 2216). In December, 1992, Miller purchased 60% ofthe stock for 
$3 million, and simultaneously offered to purchase the remaining 40% of the stock for 
$1.2 million (R. 2199-2202). Thus, the total value of Heritage was fixed at $4.2 million 
as of that time. 
Under the Contract, Kraatz was entitled to 15% of the difference between 
$4,200,000.00 and $2,500,000.00, i.e., a principal amount of $255,000.00 (for pre-
judgment interest purposes). Pre-judgment interest on this amount from December 31, 
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1992, to December 31, 1999, is $178,569.85, plus $69.86 per day thereafter until entry 
of judgment (R. 4230). 
c. Interest on Expert Witness Fees, Deposition Costs and Other Litigation 
Expenses. The amounts of expert witness fees, and other costs and expenses, were fixed 
as of the date of each invoice or billing statement sent to Kraatz for these costs and 
expenses (R. 4231-4313). Through December 31, 1999, the amount of pre-judgment 
interest accrued on expert witness fees and other costs and expenses incurred and paid by 
Kraatz totaling $48,186.26, was $18,123.44, plus $13.20 per day thereafter until entry of 
judgment (R. 4231). 
d. Interest on Attorney Fees. The amount of attorney fees awarded in this 
case was measured by the hours of service multiplied by the applicable billing rates of the 
service providers, as reflected in monthly invoices (R. 4331-4602). By reference to these 
invoices, one can determine the precise date (i.e., a fixed time) when the fees were 
incurred. Even where some charges were disallowed or reduced, the remaining charges 
were nevertheless fixed at a particular time and can be measured by facts and figures, with 
reasonable mathematical certainty. The trial court should have awarded interest of 
$79,020.51 on attorney fees, through the date of judgment (R. 4927-29; 4966). 
5. Consumer Price Index. Between the time Kraatz was wrongfully discharged 
on September 11, 1992 and March, 2001, the Consumer Price Index-Urban rose by 
20.09% (R. 4605-06). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGTTMFArT 
The trial court Judgment severely understates Kraatz's damages. The evidence 
relied upon by the trial court to find that the value of Heritage's stock was $3.1 million as 
of Kraatz's wrongful termination in September, 1992, was the testimony of Miller that he 
purchased 60% of that stock (directly or indirectly) in December, 1992 for that price. It 
was clearly erroneous, with no reasonable support in the evidence, for the trial court to 
attribute no value to the other 40% of the stock. The great weight of the evidence, 
including admissions by Miller himself, established that the value of 100% of that stock 
was $4.4 million in September, 1992. 
With regard to Kraatz's lost wages and benefits, the trial court erred in failing to 
adjust Heritage's calculation of Kraatz's profit bonus, to account for the effect on 
profitability of Miller causing Heritage to pay most of his purchase price for the Heritage 
stock, and of the undisputedly excessive rents Miller caused Heritage to pay to himself. 
With regard to the other items of Kraatz's lost wages and benefits that the trial court 
refused to award (i.e., the value of the Sports Mall membership for non-business use, the 
value of the Hidden Valley Country Club membership, additional reimbursement for the 
delay in selling Kraatz's St. George Home, the annual Christmas bonus, the value of the 
season tickets to the Utah Jazz, the retirement contributions, the participation in warranty 
income, and the additional unreimbursed health care costs), the trial court erred in 
excluding these items of damage based upon (1) the parol evidence rule, (2) lack of 
consideration, (3) lack of foreseeability of the damages claimed, or (4) that the damages 
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claimed were speculative. The erroneous application of these legal principles by the trial 
court has the effect of depriving Kraatz of the "consequential" damages he suffered as a 
result of Heritage's breach of his employment agreement. This is contrary to the ruling of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992), 
that such damages are recoverable in a wrongful termination case. 
The trial court erred as well in failing to award Kraatz his expert witness costs for 
experts that did not testify at trial, and his deposition costs for deponents that did not testify 
at trial. The Contract expressly requires that Kraatz be awarded ah of his expert witness 
costs and other litigation costs, such as depositions. Costs awarded pursuant to contract are 
not subject to the limitations on costs awarded pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
Kraatz is entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest on all of his damages, 
attorney fees and costs. Such damages, fees and costs could be determined with reasonable 
mathematical certainty, based upon facts and figures. 
In addition, pre-judgment interest is merely a form of consequential damages, 
compensating Kraatz for the loss of the use of the money to which he was entitled, during 
the period between defendant's breach, and entry of judgment (here, over eight years). 
Because defendant has wrongfully had the use of the same money during this period, 
defendant is not being penalized by being required to pay pre-judgment interest on it. 
Alternatively, Kraatz should be awarded an additional 20% of all amounts on which 
pre-judgment interest is not awarded, based upon that same percentage increase in the 
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Consumer Price Index during the period between Heritage's breach of contract and entry 
of judgment for that breach. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT 100% OF HERITAGE'S STOCK 
WAS WORTH ONLY $3.1 MILLION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Kraatz has carefully reviewed all evidence admitted during trial that might be said 
to support the trial court's findings that (1) "[t]here was little or no increase in the value 
of Heritage's stock as of September 1992" (Add. A, R. 4999) over the $2.5 million initial 
value agreed to by the parties in May 1990, and (2) that the value of 100% of Heritage's 
stock was $3,100,000.00. All such evidence is marshaled below: 
Miller testified that he purchased 60% of the stock of Heritage for between $3 and 
$3.1 million as follows (R. 2215-17): 
Q Mr. Miller, you answered a question at the end of your deposition that 
seemed to indicate that the value of this dealership was $4.2 million. My 
question to you is, why did you agree to that figure? 
# * * 
A Because — because the 1.2 million that we discussed with the children is 
being added back in that question and at that point late in the deposition that 
Mr. Zundel referred to, I answered the question without qualification that I 
felt should have been there, that if you look at it that way, with adding the 
1.2 million back for the kids, then yes, it's four two. 
Q And today as you sit here in this courtroom, what qualification should be 
added to that statement? 
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A That I think I'd bought 60 percent of the stock on the basis of between 3 and 
3.1 million dollars total and that's — and my opinion is that that's the 
valuation of the stock of that corporation as reflected in the document that 
closed the deal. 
With respect to the value of the remaining 40% of Heritage's stock, Miller testified 
as follows (R. 2217): 
Q And why — if you bought, Mr. Miller, if you bought 60 percent of the stock 
for 3,000,000 to 3,100,000, why does that equate to the value of the 
dealership? Or how does it equate to the value of the dealership? 
A Well, if the corporation pays a hundred percent of the obligations reflected 
in the formula that we've gone through earlier, then I pick up 60 percent of 
that and I think that it clearly establishes in real numbers, not any theory, but 
in real numbers what was paid in the transaction. 
Q So you paid 60 percent or you paid $360,000 for 60 percent of the stock? 
A Correct. 
Q And every other amount that was paid to Mr. Wilkinson was paid by the 
company from a hundred percent of the stock? 
A That's correct. 
Miller minimized the probative value of his offer to buy the remaining 40% of the 
stock from Wilkinson's four children (10% each) (referenced in the record at R. 
2199-2002) for $1,200,000.00, with the following testimony (R. 2201-02): 
Q Yeah but I wasn't there. Why don't you give us your explanation sir? I'm 
sure you will at a later point anyway, so tell us what you think. 
A Okay. I think that when you introduce the childrens' percentages, that then 
we seriously begin to mix apples and oranges because Bry and I had been 
talking about this deal since 1983 or 4 in one form or another. The first 
discussion we had and every subsequent discussion over the years included 
the opening line, or very close to it, that my kids have to be taken care of in 
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this deal, so that the agreement, when I said I extended it as one part of the 
offer to buy his children out for $300,000.00 each, it was in keeping with an 
agreement I'd been making with him for 11 or 12 years that I don't think 
was relevant to the value of the stock, but keeping a commitment. 
I also told him that I thought they would be unwise to take $300,000.00 for 
it because even though for the last few years it seemed their share of the 
stock seemed [sic] very little practical value, my hope and plan was that it 
would, to get to have value and that it would serve them for many years if 
they retained ownership rather than cash out at that time, but to me, the $1.2 
million takes on a different character than the stock value. 
Now if you go back to the way you've been asking, is that what Bry got or 
would have gotten, then the answer is yes. If you talk about the value of the 
stock, I still say it comes back to $3 million. That's a matter of definition 
andopinion, I suppose, but I think its important, an important clarification. 
Miller testified that he has purchased between 30 and 35 dealerships and that he 
"generally" only pays $2 million "blue sky" in addition to the net book value of the 
dealership (which in this case was $1,100,000.00) (R. 2217-18). 
Other evidence which might be construed as supportive of the Court's finding is as 
follows: In May 1990, at the time Kraatz signed the Contract (27 months prior to his 
wrongful discharge on September 11, 1992), he and Heritage agreed in paragraph 1 .(c)(1) 
of Schedule "B" of the Contract (Add. C) that the fair market value of 100% of Heritage's 
stock was $2,500,000.00, "[fjor the purposes of this paragraph." Id. 
Heritage lost money in two of the three years during which Kraatz was employed 
(albeit he was employed for only seven months in 1990 and eight months in 1992) as 
follows: (1990) <$295,515.00>; (1991) +$5,169.00; (1992) <$124,980.00> (Add. 
A, R. 5000). 
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Wilkinson testified that he felt the net worth of the dealership had declined by 50% 
since Kraatz was employed (R. 2035-36): 
Kraatz's valuation expert, Mark Schmidt, Ph.D., testified that his valuation of $4.4 
million was in part based upon a subjectively determined capitalization rate (R. 2286, 
2300), which he applied to the dealership's actual income after he made adjustments 
thereto, based, in part, on National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) guidelines 
(which is a compilation of averages for the best Honda dealers) (R. 2302, 2322), not the 
actual costs incurred by this particular dealership (R. 2322). 
The company's financial statements (as summarized by Defendants' Ex. 593, see 
also Add. A, R. 5000) shows that the average gross income earned for new and used 
vehicles sold during Kraatz's employment declined during the years he was employed as 
follows: 
Used Cars New Cars 
1990 $642/unit 1990 $l,120/unit 
1991 $533/unit 1991 $ 950/unit 
1992 $577/unit 1992 $l,312/unit 
The foregoing evidence is not sufficient to support the trial court's finding that 
100% of Heritage's stock was worth only $3.1 million in light of the great weight of the 
evidence as demonstrated below. 
The trial court's finding that "Larry H. Miller testified he purchased the dealership 
for between $3 and $3.1 million" is an erroneous observation of how Miller actually 
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testified. Miller clearly testified that he purchased only 60% of the dealership for between 
$3 and $3.1 million (R. 2216-17). 
Miller's deposition testimony was read into the record wherein he admitted that 
100% of the stock of Heritage as of December, 1992 had a minimum value of 4.2 million 
and was worth as much as $200,000.00 more in September of 1992 (for a total of 4.4 
million dollars) when Kraatz was wrongfully discharged as follows (R. 2210-13): 
Q As of January, 1993, your deal with Bry Wilkinson, as far as compensation 
that he would get for his shares was fixed; isn't that right? 
* * * 
A Well I think so, but — so I would say by January that it was fixed. I would 
say that by January of 1993 I think that was fixed, yeah. 
Q He was going to get 3 million dollars for 60%? 
A That's correct. 
Q That didn't ever change between January and afterward? 
A No. 
Q And did I understand your testimony yesterday that if you had — that you 
were willing at that time to pay the children $300,000.00 each for their 10% 
each? 
A At that point I was not thinking of buying them out, but that would be valid, 
yes. 
Q So that would be an additional $1,200,000.00 that would be paid? 
A That would. 
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Q And would it be fair to say that the minimum value of the store without real 
estate would be 4.2 million? 
A I would agree to that. 
* * * 
Q [ ] — the value of the store as of September, 1992? 
A Ok. 
Q Would be at least 4.2 million and perhaps $200,000.00 more than that; is 
that correct? 
A I would agree to that. 
Miller corroborated this deposition testimony at trial by stating that the total value 
of Heritage's stock was worth $194,000.00 more in September 1992 than in December 
1992 (R. 2200). Miller's testimony (quoted above in support of the trial court's finding) 
that he "generally" pays 2 million dollars blue sky plus book value when acquiring a 
dealership was followed by cross examination wherein he admitted that he in fact paid 
more than $2 million blue sky for Wilkinson's stock in Heritage (R. 2225-26) and that he 
had done so in purchasing other dealerships as well. (Id.) He admitted also that in August 
of 1992 (just weeks before Kraatz was discharged) that he was willing to pay $3.4 million 
in blue sky (but not as much as $4 million) plus book value (R. 2205-10) and that the book 
value in September, 1992 of Heritage was $1.2 million for a total value of $4.6 million 
dollars (R. 2209). 
Miller also admitted in his deposition that he used a pro-rata approach to purchasing 
the stock of Heritage, with the following testimony read into the record at R. 2223-25: 
-32-
Q So had you gone through with the deal that was contemplated between you 
and Mr. Wilkinson just before you wrote the August 29 [1992] letter, you 
would have owned 100% of the stock? 
A Or adjusted the price accordingly. For example, had I bought 60%, then I 
would have paid 60% of the price. 
Applying this calculation to Mr. Miller's purchase of 60% of Heritage's stock for 
between $3 million and $3.1 million yields an indicated value as of December 1992 of 
between $5 million and $5,166,666.00. 
Miller's willingness to pay so much for the dealership is easily understood in light 
of his testimony that his review of Heritage's books showed that due to Wilkinson's 
expenditures the historic expenses were "out of whack" (R. 2084) and that he recognized 
Heritage presented an opportunity he could take advantage of (R. 2085). In addition to 
Heritage's expected adjusted income, he expected to make $300.00 per car, or 
approximately $750,000.00 per year in "ancillary income" from his ownership interest in 
Heritage (R. 2072-74).2 
Dr. Mark Schmitz, Ph.D., a qualified expert for valuing Honda dealerships, opined 
that the value of 100% of Heritage's stock as of September, 1992 was $4.4 million (R. 
2237; 2242; 2252). In determining the value of Heritage, Dr. Schmitz adjusted historical 
Ancillary income is income to the owner of the dealership which flows from (1) 
management fees; (2) sales of service contracts; and (3) sales of credit life insurance 
(R. 2072). Income from these ancillary sources normally does not appear on the income 
statement of the dealership because it is generated by separate companies owned or 
controlled by the owner/dealer. (Id.) Miller confirmed that all large automobile dealers, 
of which there are several in Utah, and many throughout the nation, would make ancillary 
income from a dealership such as Heritage (R. 2073). 
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income statements of Heritage for expenditures which were not within industry standards 
as a result of Wilkinson's personal expenditures (Ex. 329, Tabs 2 and 3; R. 2237; 
2256-60) just as Miller did (R. 2071). {See, for example, R. 2170-71; 2177-78; 2181-82 
and Ex. 329, Tab 2 showing that for the years 1989 through 1992, Wilkinson took as much 
as $281,877.00 out of the business for his personal benefit over and above the more than 
$240,000.00 reported in W-2 income for each of those years.) 
Such expenditures included an instance in November, 1990, when Wilkinson caused 
Heritage to assume and show on its books a $200,000.00 loan from Comerica Bank, which 
another dealership, solely owned by Wilkinson, was not able to pay. (Id.) In that same 
year, Wilkinson caused Heritage to begin paying a $100,000.00 debt to the FSLIC 
incurred by Wilkinson as a director of a failed savings and loan. (Id.) Such adjustments 
by Dr. Schmitz of the historic accounting records were premised on the undisputed and 
reasonable assumption that potential buyers would make the same types of adjustments, 
when reviewing the income statements, as a method of predicting future income. The 
adjustments showed that Heritage could be expected to make a profit in excess of 
$700,000.00 per year (excluding additional ancillary income of $750,000.00 per year) (R. 
2433) if expenditures were kept within industry standards (R. 2238). There is no evidence 
in the record contrary to Dr. Schmitz' opinion. 
The parties' agreement that in May, 1990 the "initial value" of 100% of Heritage 
stock was $2,500,000.00 is not good evidence of the value of the stock 27 months later, 
when Kraatz was wrongfully discharged because: (1) the agreement is a stipulated value 
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and has no independent evidentiary basis such as an actual sale might have; and (2) as a 
matter of law, the valuation date is to remote to be reliable. Glezos v. Frontier Investments, 
896 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah App. 1995) (clear error for the trial court to ignore unrebutted 
evidence of appraiser and rely instead on sale three years after relevant valuation date). In 
this case the relevant valuation date is September 11, 1992. 
The trial court's oral finding that "the corporate net worth declined to approximately 
one-half from June 1, '90 to August of '92" (R. 2470, Add. A, R. 5000) is supported only 
by Wilkinson's testimony at R 2035-36 that "the net worth of the dealership in total, as I 
remember, was reduced almost in half from June 1st of '90 until August of '92" (R. 
2035-36). However, the financial statements show that on May 31, 1990, the Murray 
dealership's net worth was $908,790.00 (Ex. 295, Bates No. 000069, Line 62) and that 
on August 31, 1992, it was $737,681.00 (Ex. 297, Bates No. 000185, Line 63), for a 
decline of only 18.83%, not "approximately one-half." The trial court's reliance on 
Wilkinson's oral testimony, as opposed to the financial statements themselves, was clear 
error. Both parties in this case offered the financial statements into evidence (R. 2323-24). 
The fact that Heritage may have lost money after Kraatz's employment began was 
explicitly considered by both Miller and Dr. Schmitz in coming to their valuations and/or 
admissions of value (R. 2084; 2238). Inasmuch as Heritage's expenses undisputedly 
exceeded industry standards [Ex. 329 (Tabs 2 and 3)] and as Miller stated were "out of 
whack" (R. 2084), Heritage's historic lack of profitability is not a reasonable basis to 
ignore Miller's admissions of value or the unrebutted opinion of Dr. Schmitz. 
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The trial court's reliance on Miller's testimony for its valuation of 100% of 
Heritage's stock at $3.1 million is clearly erroneous given Miller's actual testimony that 
he purchased only 60% of the stock for that amount. It is not reasonable to say that the 
other 40% on the same day was worthless; particularly, when Miller admitted that he was 
willing to pay $1.2 million for it. The overwhelming weight of the evidence, from Kraatz's 
expert as well as Miller himself, established that the value of 100% of the stock was no 
less than $4.4 million in September 1992. Thus, Kraatz was entitled to stock appreciation 
damages of $285,000.00 rather than the $90,000.00 awarded by the trial court. 
POINT II 
KRAATZ IS ENTITLED TO CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING FROM 
THE LOSS OF BENEFITS OF EMPLOYMENT IN ADDITION TO THE 
MINIMUM COMPENSATION REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACT 
Kraatz is entitled to recover both the benefit of his bargain and consequential 
damages. Heslop, supra, 839 P.2d at 840-41 (wrongfully terminated employee entitled to 
broad range of both general and consequential damages). The proper measure of Kraatz's 
damages is calculated by comparing what he would have received in compensation and 
benefits as the general manager of Heritage between September 11, 1992 (the date of 
discharge), and June 1, 1995 (the end of the five year Contract term), with what he 
actually received from his subsequent employment. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. 
Smith, 637 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1981). All reasonably foreseeable losses, costs and expenses 
are recoverable by a wrongfully terminated employee, as either benefit of the bargain or 
consequential damages. See Heslop, 839 P.2d at 840-841. A claim of damages based on 
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actual compensation history is not speculative. Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 414 Mass. 468, 608 
N.E.2d 1028, 1038-39 (1993). 
In terms of his lost wages and benefits (i.e., profit bonus, the Sports Mall 
membership, Hidden Valley Country Club membership, St. George home reimbursement, 
annual Christmas bonus, Utah Jazz tickets, retirement contributions, participation in 
warranty income, and unreimbursed health care costs), Kraatz is seeking to recover only 
the objectively measurable economic amounts he would have received during the 
remainder of his contract term, as evidenced by the wages and benefits he actually received 
while employed, and the compensation and benefits received by his less experienced 
successor. 
An implied-in-fact contract is created when an employer makes representations or 
promises that employees reasonably understand to constitute a promise in exchange for 
continuing services. See, Berube v. Fashion Center, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 
1989). For purposes of damages, there is no articulable reason to distinguish between 
employment contracts "implied in fact," as in Heslop, or written. 
Indeed, although the written Contract here required compensation to Kraatz at 
certain minimum amounts, each time Kraatz received a raise or "additional compensation" 
during his employment, a new implied-in-fact contract for the additional compensation was 
created, or the old contract was modified so as to incorporate the new or modified 
elements of compensation. Even where, as here, a contract provides that it may be 
amended only in writing (Add. C, Section 5.2, R. 4064), the parties are free to amend it 
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verbally (or by course of conduct). See, TedR. Brown and Assoc, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 
753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988). 
Under a "consequential damage" analysis, damages from the loss of each of the 
elements of compensation and benefits for which Kraatz now seeks recovery became 
foreseeable at the time each element was added to his compensation package. As such, the 
damages now sought were foreseeable at the time any new contract was "made," or, 
alternatively, the old contract was "modified." With respect to each element of lost wages 
and benefits damages, the evidence on foreseeability is unrebutted, and the trial court's 
conclusion of law to the contrary was erroneous. 
The trial court also committed legal error in ruling that Kraatz could not use 
extrinsic evidence to prove the totality of his damages (R. 5016). In making this ruling, 
the trial court purported to rely on this Court's decision in the first appeal, holding that the 
termination for cause provisions of the Contract were unambiguous, and that the trial court 
erred in considering extrinsic evidence on that issue (Id.). 
However, nothing in this Court's prior decision, holding Heritage liable for breach 
of the Contract, prevented Kraatz from using extrinsic evidence to establish what 
"additional compensation," as contemplated by the Contract, was actually agreed to by 
Heritage or what consequential damages he suffered as a result of the breach. See, Stanger 
v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983) (parol evidence may be 
used to show remaining terms of partially integrated agreement, or to show contract 
modification). Extrinsic evidence is almost always necessary in order to prove 
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consequential damages. See, Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 
1985) (consequential damages reach beyond the bare contract terms). 
The trial court also erred, as a matter of law, in finding (based on its earlier 
reversed findings on the liability issue) no consideration for the "additional compensation" 
to which Heritage admits it agreed (Add. A, R. 5001). The consideration for this 
compensation was Kraatz's continued performance of services that Heritage believed 
justified the additional compensation. See, Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 56, 
n. 2 (Utah 1991). Moreover, consideration is not an issue as to consequential damages that 
reach beyond the bare contract terms. 
With these legal principles in mind, Kraatz now turns to the specific items of 
damage rejected by the trial court and the specific evidence and findings of the trial court 
pertaining thereto. 
1. Profit Sharing. The trial court erred, as a matter of law, in interpreting the 
contract so as to allow Larry Miller to arbitrarily decrease reported profits upon which 
Kraatz's bonus was based. In calculating the value of Kraatz's profit bonus, the trial court 
ignored the adjustments to Heritage's accounting that should have been made to eliminate 
the effect of Miller causing Heritage to pay the bulk of the purchase price for the Heritage 
stock he bought, and of Miller causing Heritage to pay undisputedly excessive rents to 
himself. 
Every contract is imbued with an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
TedR. Brown and Assoc, Inc., supra. It is not fair or in good faith for Heritage to require 
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Kraatz to bear any of the financial burden of Miller's purchase of Wilkinson's stock, or 
for Heritage to unilaterally decrease corporate profits by inflating the rents paid to Miller, 
as the company's landlord and majority shareholder. Heritage never offered any evidence 
challenging plaintiffs adjustment to these items. 
The trial court confused " . . . accounting practices acceptable to . . . American 
Honda . . . " in paragraph (b) of Schedule A to the Employment Agreement (Add. C, R. 
4067), with expenditures that were excessive or unfair. In claiming an adjustment, Kraatz 
is not arguing that the accounting practices were somehow improper, but rather that the 
expenditures accounted for were unreasonable and should therefore be adjusted in order 
to give Kraatz the benefit of his bargain. 
The trial court's findings that Heritage's accounting practices were known to Kraatz 
and never changed (Add. A, R. 4997) are irrelevant, because they do not address the 
amounts accounted for. The excessive rent paid to Miller and the amounts paid to 
Wilkinson for his stock, appeared only after Kraatz was wrongfully discharged. They were 
not expenditures that can fairly and reasonably be charged to Kraatz for the purpose of 
calculating his share of Heritage's profits after his employment was wrongfully terminated. 
Miller could just as easily have artificially deflated the company's profits by paying 
himself a monthly bonus equal to all of the profits made by Heritage during any month. 
Under this hypothetical, Kraatz would be entitled to an adjustment, without attacking the 
"accounting procedures" per se. 
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Thus Kraatz is entitled to a net profit bonus of $26,894.34 after mitigation 
(calculated as gross bonus of $107,952.03 less $81,057.68 profit bonus earned from 
subsequent employment = $26,894.34) (Ex. 302), rather than the negative $46,082.28 the 
trial court imposed as an offset against Kraatz's other damages. 
2. Unreimbursed Health Care Costs. With regard to Kraatz's claim for 
unreimbursed health care costs, the trial court found that Kraatz made an oral agreement 
to "forego" payment of unreimbursed health costs (R. 4999, 1837-38). However, the 
portion of the record the trial court cites in support of this finding shows that Kraatz 
merely agreed to "postpone" this payment (R. 1837-38). Thus, Kraatz is entitled to 
additional damages of $3,484.26 (Ex. 302). 
3. St. George House Reimbursement. The trial court also found that Heritage 
never agreed to pay the differential between Kraatz's receipt of rental on his St. George 
home, and the amount of his mortgage on his Salt Lake home, "indefinitely" (Add. A, R. 
5001-02; R. 1859). However, Kraatz's testimony cited by the trial court in support of this 
finding is that Heritage did not agree to pay this differential "forever" (R. 1859). Heritage 
did agree to make the payment until the St. George home was sold, which was unknown 
and therefore "indefinite" when the promise was made. Therefore, Kraatz is entitled to an 
additional $2,210.53 based on Mr. Wisan's undisputed calculations (Ex. 302). 
4. Retirement Contributions. The trial court made no factual determinations in 
support of its refusal to award Kraatz consequential damages for the loss of retirement 
contributions he would have received during the term of his employment under Heritage's 
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401-k retirement plan. There was no evidence presented that this plan was ever terminated 
or modified in any way during the remaining term of the Contract. Therefore, Kraatz is 
entitled to additional $8,109.04 pursuant to Mr. Wisan's unchallenged calculation 
(Ex. 302). 
5. Annual Christmas Bonuses. Similarly, the trial court made no findings in 
support of its refusal to include the value of this lost benefit in its damage award. No 
evidence was adduced that this benefit was not given to Heritage employees after Kraatz 
was terminated or that Kraatz would not have received this benefit had he stayed. 
Therefore, Kraatz is entitled to additional damages of $1,500.00 pursuant to Mr. Wisan's 
unrefuted calculation (Ex. 302). 
6. Participation in Warranty Income. Again, the trial court made no findings 
of fact in support of its refusal to include this damage award for Kraatz's loss of this 
valuable benefit. There was no evidence presented at trial refuting the facts that (a) this 
type of income had become an important part of Kraatz's compensation, (b) it is common 
practice in the industry to compensate general managers by allowing them to share in the 
income from sales of warranty contracts, (c) that Kraatz's successor, Jeff Wilkinson, 
shared in this type of income, or (d) challenging Mr. Wisan's method of calculating the 
value of this benefit to Kraatz during the remaining term of his contract. Therefore, Kraatz 
is entitled to additional damages of $119,856.51 (Ex. 302). 
7. Country Club Membership. The trial court's finding that Kraatz actually 
never used the membership to the country club during his employment is irrelevant given 
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that Kraatz was not ever given a country club membership and was not entitled to one 
under the Contract until three months prior to the time he was fired. Wisan's calculations 
of the value of this contractually mandated benefit, for businesses uses only, based upon 
Kraatz's estimate of how much golf he would play with business guests, was unrefuted. 
Therefore, Kraatz is entitled to additional damages of $10,863.00 (Ex. 302). 
8. Sports Mall Membership and Jazz Tickets. The trial court made no factual 
findings to the effect that these benefits enjoyed by Kraatz during his employment and 
which had admittedly become part of his compensation would not have continued during 
the remainder of the term of the Contract. There was no evidence presented from which 
to make such findings. Mr. Wisan's calculations were unrefuted and therefore Kraatz is 
entitled to additional damages of $4,537.50 and $18,898.50, respectively, pursuant to Mr. 
Wisan's unrefuted calculations (Ex. 302). 
In sum, the evidence of the "additional compensation" Heritage agreed to pay 
Kraatz was undisputed, and the trial court erred in failing to award any consequential 
damages at all. 
POINT III 
UNDER THE CONTRACT, PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ALL OF HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEES AND DEPOSITION COSTS 
In refusing to award Kraatz witness fees for experts who did not testify at trial, and 
deposition costs for deponents who did not testify at trial, the trial court appears to have 
applied limitations imposed by UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(d), as interpreted by Utah case law. 
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However, Rule 54(d) does not apply in light of Section 5.6 of the Contract which requires 
an award of " . . . aU expenses and costs incurred . . . including . . . expert witness fees, 
and/or deposition costs . . . " (Add. C, R. 4065, emphasis added). See, Chase v. Scott, 
2001 Ut. Ct. App. 404, 11 18-20, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 20. 
In Chase, this Court held that". . . in order to give effect to the term 'costs' in the 
Contract, we hold that 'costs' should not be limited by case law interpreting Rule 54(d)". 
2001 Utah Ct. App. 404, 1 20. 
Thus, the trial court here should be directed to award Kraatz an additional 
$12,684.17 in expert witness fees, and an additional $9,369.90 in deposition costs. 
POINT IV 
KRAATZ IS ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON ALL OF HIS 
DAMAGES, ATTORNEY FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES 
A. KRAATZ'S DAMAGES, ATTORNEY FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES 
COULD ALL BE CALCULATED WITH REASONABLE MATHEMATICAL 
CERTAINTY, BASED ON FACTS AND FIGURES. 
The current law in Utah with regard to pre-judgment interest is summarized as 
follows: 
Where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is 
fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by 
facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time and 
not from the date of judgment. On the other hand, where 
damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with 
mathematical accuracy . . . the amount of the damages must be 
ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at the trial, and 
in such cases pre-judgment interest is not allowed. 
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Utah Foam Products Co. v. Upjohn, 930 F.Supp. 513, 523 (D. Utah 1996) aff'd. 154 F.3d 
1212 (10th Cir. 1998), cert, denied, 526 U.S. 1051 (1999) [citing Bjork v. April Indus., 
Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977)]. 
This Court has also explained: 
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they 
must be ascertained "in accordance with fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value, which the court or 
jury must follow in fixing the amount rather than be guided by 
their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for 
past as well as for future injury, or for elements that cannot be 
measured by any fixed standards of value." 
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475, 483 (Utah 
App. 1989) [quoting Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907)]. 
Cases that have applied the above principles in awarding pre-judgment interest 
include Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983), and Bjork, supra. In 
Jorgensen, the court found the calculation of damages sufficiently certain to award interest 
under a contract to purchase 10,000 sheep at a stated price per pound. The court stated: 
This is not an instance such as a case involving personal 
injury, false imprisonment, wrongful death, defamation or the 
like. Regardless of variability of the weight of the sheep, these 
damages were mathematically calculated. The jury awarded 
seller damages based upon the difference between what seller 
should have received under the contract with buyer and what 
he actually received from [another buyer] as of the date of last 
delivery. Seller was entitled to interest on that difference. 
660P.2dat233. 
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Similarly, in Bjork, the court found that damages under a stock registration 
agreement were sufficiently fixed and measurable. In Bjork* the defendant issued stock 
with a restrictive legend stating that the shares could not be transferred, but agreed to 
include these shares in any future public offering of common stock. The holders of the 
restricted stock brought suit when the company refused to include their stock in the public 
offering and remove the restrictive legend. 
To calculate damages, the court assumed the stock would have been sold at its 
highest price during the public offering and then reduced that price by the present value 
of the stock and a typical sales commission on stock sales. Stating the general rule, the 
court awarded pre-judgment interest on that amount because "the law in Utah is clear, viz: 
where the damage is complete and the amount is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss 
can be measured by facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time and not 
from the date of judgment." 560 P.2d at 317 (citations omitted). In addition, pre-judgment 
interest is awardable even on disputed amounts, where the amount awarded at trial can be 
determined with the requisite mathematical certainty. See, Lefavi v. Bertoch, supra, 2000 
Utah Ct. App. 5, 11 22-27. 
Applying these general principles to the case at hand, Kraatz is entitled to pre-
judgment interest on the various components of his damage award on which the trial court 
refused to award pre-judgment interest, as demonstrated below. 
1. Pre-judgment Interest on Kraatz's Wage and Benefits Damages. There is no 
evidence contesting the calculation of the amounts due Kraatz for Sports Mall dues and 
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expenses, Christmas bonuses, Jazz tickets, retirement contributions, St. George house 
mortgage reimbursements, or lost profits from the sale of warranty service contracts. 
Therefore, Kraatz should recover pre-judgment interest on all of these amounts. 
With respect to the calculation of Kraatz's contractual right to share in the profits 
of the enterprise over $280,000.00 per year, the only question presented is whether the 
adjustments to Heritage's monthly income statements made by Kraatz's accountant should 
have been allowed by the trial court. The adjustments do not involve future projections or 
other unquantifiable or speculative determinations. The question is a simple one-are the 
adjustments necessary to ensure that Kraatz receives the benefit of his bargain under the 
contract? Once that question is answered, there is no ambiguity or uncertainty about the 
calculation of the amount due. Therefore, pre-judgment interest should be allowed on this 
item of damage. 
Also, Kraatz is only asking for pre-judgment interest to be applied to the portion of 
his wage and benefits damages that have not been mitigated, as set out in Ex. 302. For 
most months, the monthly damages requested are less than Kraatz's base salary of 
$8,000.00/month under his contract. Therefore, pre-judgment interest should be applied 
on a monthly basis to the net amount of damages after mitigation. 
2. Pre-judgment Interest on Kraatz's Share of the Stock Appreciation. The 
evidence of the December 1992 arms-length sale by Wilkinson of 60% of the stock in 
Heritage for $3 million, and Miller's offer to buy the remaining 40% for an additional 
$1.2 million (R. 2199-2202) satisfy the requirements of Utah law for the accrual of pre-
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judgment interest from and after December 1992. In arguing for pre-judgment interest 
based on the known value of Heritage's stock as of December 1992, Kraatz does not waive 
his claim for the value of the stock, as of September 11, 1992, when he was wrongfully 
discharged. At trial it was undisputed that the stock of Heritage was worth between 
$194,000.00 and $200,000.00 more in September than in December 1992, due to losses 
sustained by Heritage in the interim period, which decreased Heritage's book value 
(R. 2200, 2205). 
When values are at issue, as is the case with respect to the value of the Heritage 
stock, Utah law requires evidence of "known standards of value." Price-Orem Inv. Co., 
supra, 784 P.2d at 483. An actual arms-length sale is indisputably a "known standard of 
value." Miller's offer to buy the remaining 40% for $1,200,000.00 is a "known standard" 
for a minimum valuation. 
As of December 1992, it was clear to Heritage that Kraatz's stock appreciation 
rights would yield to Kraatz at least $255,000.00 (calculated as follows: $4,200,000.00 
less $2,500,000.00 = $1,700,000.00 x 15% = $255,000.00), and that at least that sum 
was due Kraatz at that time. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Trail Mountain 
Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1370 (Utah 1996) 
cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1142 (1997), pre-judgment interest is awarded "to compensate a 
party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a corollary, deters 
parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing." 
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At a minimum, Kraatz should be allowed pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% 
per annum on $255,000.00 of his $285,000.00 claim from and after December 31, 1992. 
3
- Pre-judgment Interest on Kraatz's Expert Witness Fees. Costs and Expenses. 
Under the Contract, Kraatz is entitled to recover "all expenses and costs incurred" by him 
including, but not limited to, "expert witness fees" and "deposition costs." There is no 
issue under the Contract of whether such costs and expenses are "reasonable," as there is 
with attorney fees. Heritage's obligation to pay all such costs and expenses incurred by 
Kraatz was mathematically certain as of the time the costs and expenses were incurred.3 
In James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P. 2d 665, 672 (Utah App. 1994), 
this Court noted that pre-judgment interest on attorney fees is allowed in Utah where the 
reasonableness of the fees is not at issue. See also, First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. 
Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982) (allowing pre-judgment interest on 
attorney fees awarded to prevailing party arising out of wrongful attachment of cattle). 
Thus pre-judgment interest should be awarded to plaintiff on all expert witness fees, 
deposition costs, and other litigation expenses. 
4. Pre-judgment Interest on Kraatz's Attorney Fees. Kraatz is entitled to pre-
judgment interest on the attorney fees awarded in this case because: (1) the Utah Court of 
Appeals' explanation in James Constructors, Inc., supra, of the Utah Supreme Court's 
3Under the Contract, Heritage is liable for costs and expenses "incurred" by Kraatz. 
Thus, contrary to the trial court's decision (R. 5004), interest on these costs and expenses 
should run from the date Kraatz "incurred" them, rather than from the date Kraatz paid 
them. The trial court also indicated that Kraatz may not have been required to pay interest 
on some unpaid amounts owed to experts (R. 5004), but there is no evidence of this. 
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holding in J.B.J. Feedyards, supra, is an incorrect and overly restrictive reading of the 
case, and (2) as evidenced by the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Heslop, supra, a 
strong public policy argument exists for insuring that wrongfully terminated employees 
receive full and fair compensation from their former employers. 
Contrary to this Court's 1994 decision in James Constructors, Inc., in 1982 the 
Utah Supreme Court allowed pre-judgment interest on attorney fees where the fees were 
incurred in having property released from a wrongful attachment. J.B.J. Feedyards, 653 
P.2d at 597. The Supreme Court applied the Utah rule regarding pre-judgment interest, 
and held that pre-judgment interest would apply to attorney fee damages because the 
amount is "fixed as of the time of claimed damages." Id. at 600. 
In James Constructors, Inc., this Court criticized the Supreme Court's decision in 
J.BJ. Feedyards as being "without analysis." 888 P.2d at 671. However, the Supreme 
Court in J.B.J. Feedyards noted the relevant facts and expressly applied the law in 
determining that the attorney fees allowed by the trial court should be augmented by 
pre-judgment interest. Although the analysis was short, there was an analysis. 
In James Constructors, this Court also attempted to distinguish J. B. J. Feedyards by 
stating that in the latter case "the reasonableness of the fees was not at issue." 888 P.2d 
at 672. To the contrary, in J.BJ. Feedyards the trial court considered evidence regarding 
attorney fees and determined that the figure of $10,000.00 "appropriately compensated" 
the attorney for services for which his client was entitled to recover fees. 653 P.2d at 597. 
Obviously, in J.B.J. Feedyards & decision was made as to the reasonableness of the 
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attorney fees awarded. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was entitled to pre-judgment interest. 
Therefore, J.BJ. Feedyards should still be considered controlling authority by this Court, 
and pre-judgment interest should be calculated on the attorney fees awarded in this case. 
Also, this Court awarded pre-judgment interest on attorney fees in Campbell, Maack 
& Sessions v. Debry, 2001 Ut. Ct. App. 397, 436, Utah Adv. Rep. 37. Campbell was a 
suit by a law firm to collect unpaid fees owed by a former client. One of the issues 
defendant attempted to raise was the reasonableness of the fees sought. 2001 Ut. Ct. App. 
397, t1 10, 12. Nevertheless, this Court affirmed the award of pre-judgment interest on 
the attorney fees, on the basis that the trial court had sufficient information to calculate the 
amount of the fees with mathematical certainty as of a particular time. 2001 Ut. Ct. App. 
397, 123. 
Further, in Heslop, supra, the Utah Supreme Court analogized the vulnerable 
position of a wrongfully discharged employee to that of an insured wrongfully denied 
coverage, and therefore, on policy grounds, carved out an exception to the generally 
accepted American rule regarding attorney fees, and allowed such fees to be recovered as 
"consequential damages." 839 P.2d 840. The same rationale and public policy should be 
applied here to allow pre-judgment interest on the attorney fees incurred by the wrongfully 
terminated employee, Kraatz. 
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B. KRAATZ SHOULD BE AWARDED CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (IN THE 
FORM OF INTEREST) FOR THE LOSS OF THE USE OF THE PRINCIPAL 
DAMAGE AWARD OVER TIME. 
Kraatz should be awarded pre-judgment interest on all of his damages caused by 
Heritage's wrongful termination of Kraatz's employment Contract, even if this Court 
determines that some of these damages cannot be measured by facts and figures, or 
calculated with mathematical certainty. Heritage has had the use of, and opportunity to 
invest, money belonging to Kraatz since September 1992, when Heritage wrongfully 
terminated the Contract, or at times thereafter when amounts due Kraatz under the contract 
should have been paid. Kraatz has not had the use of, or the opportunity to invest, this 
money, during these periods, and has suffered consequential damages as the result. 
The apparent rationale for requiring damages to be calculable with mathematical 
certainty before pre-judgment interest may be awarded is that, otherwise, the defendant 
cannot determine the amount he or she is required to pay. However, this reasoning is 
flawed. It does not matter whether the defendant can determine the amount of damages he 
or she owes. Whatever that amount is, defendant has had the benefit of the use of the 
money during the period between the time plaintiffs claim arose and the time judgment 
on that claim is entered, and plaintiff has not. 
Many courts have agreed with this analysis, including the U.S. Supreme Court, as 
early as 1933: 
It has been recognized that a distinction . . . simply as between 
cases of liquidated and unliquidated damages, is not a sound 
one. Whether the case is of the one class or the other, the 
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injured party has suffered a loss which mav be regarded as not 
fully compensated if he is confined to the amount found to be 
recoverable as of the time of breach and nothing is added for 
the delay in obtaining the award of damages. Because of this 
fact, the rule with respect to unliquidated claims has been in 
evolution . . . and in the absence of legislation the courts have 
dealt with the question of allowing interest according to their 
conception of the demands of justice and practicality . . . 'The 
disinclination to allow interest on claim of uncertain amount 
seems based on practice rather than theoretical grounds." 3 
Williston, Contr. § 1413. 
See, Funkhouserv. J.B. Preston Company, Inc., 290U.S. 163, 168-169(1933) (emphasis 
added, footnote and some citations deleted.) 
Other courts agree with the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Phillips, 
470 P.2d 266 (Alaska 1970), the Alaska Supreme Court discussed the wisdom of an 
Alaskan pre-judgment interest statute, which it interpreted as not distinguishing between 
liquidated and unliquidated claims: 
Denying interest on unliquidated damages erroneously 
subordinates plaintiffs interest in full compensation to a 
feeling that defendant should not be penalized for failing 
promptly to pay an uncertain amount.4 
Id. at 273, n. 27. 
Phillips also discussed that failing to award pre-judgment interest on uncertain 
damage amounts encourages defendants to litigate valid claims, such as plaintiffs breach 
of contract claims here, rather than settle them. Id. at 273, n. 27 and 274. Unavailability 
4Of course Heritage is not being penalized by being required to pay pre-judgment 
interest on uncertain amounts it could invest, or receive interest on, until judgment is 
entered. 
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of pre-judgment interest also encourages defendants to prolong litigation, as is the case 
here, where Kraatz's claim was pending for over eight years prior to judgment. 
In Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla. 1985), the Florida 
Supreme Court held that under Florida law, a prevailing party is entitled to pre-judgment 
interest on all damages (except in personal injury cases). The court noted that pre-judgment 
interest on uncertain amounts does not penalize the defendant, but merely makes the 
plaintiff whole. The verdict liquidates the amount, on which pre-judgment interest runs 
from the date this amount was due. 
Other cases that awarded pre-judgment interest as part of damages, even where 
principal damage amounts may not be determinable until trial, include Essex House v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Inc. Co., 404 F.Supp. 978, 995 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (noting rate of 
investment return defendant presumably received during pendency of litigation); Emery v. 
Tilo Roofing Co. Inc., 195 A. 409, 412-413 (N.H. 1937) and Texas cases that have been 
superceded by statute. See, Cavnarv. Quality Control Parking Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 
1985) (awarding pre-judgment interest on damages in wrongful death case); Perry Roofing 
Co. v. Olcott, 744 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1988) (applying Cavnar in awarding pre-judgment 
interest on uncertain damage amounts in breach of contract case) and Johnson & Higgins 
of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 528-534 (Tex. 1998) (noting 
Cavnar line of cases superceded by statute).5 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 354(2) would allow pre-judgment 
interest as part of the damages for breach of contract, "as justice requires," even where the 
principal amount of damages is not readily ascertainable. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that pre-judgment interest is part of 
plaintiffs damages in a breach of contract case. In Farnworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571 
(Utah 1950) the Court explained that there are two types of interest, that provided for by 
contract and "moratory" interest awarded in a breach of contract case as part of plaintiff s 
damages for unlawful detention of money due the defendant. Id. at 575, quoting 30 
AM. JUR. § 2, page 6. In Farnworth the purchaser of real estate failed to pay the principal 
and interest due under the purchase contract. The Court held that the purchaser was liable 
not only for the principal and contract rate of interest, but also for moratory interest at the 
legal rate on the unpaid contract interest. The Court reasoned that plaintiffs damages 
included the loss of the use of the contracted for interest that should have been paid. Id. 
at 576-577. See also, Ong Intl. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 
1993), in which the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an award of $87,860.00 as the 
reasonable rate of return on restitutionary damages, if plaintiff had invested the damage 
amount during the period that defendant had the use of the money. 
Pre-judgment interest is a necessary part of Kraatz's damage claim here, to make 
him whole as a result of the delay in receiving the principal amount of his damages. Thus, 
there is no principled reason for distinguishing between damages that are readily calculable 
and those that may not be, in awarding pre-judgment interest. Just as damages that will be 
incurred in the future are discounted to their present value to reflect the time value of 
money, pre-judgment interest must be paid on ah damages incurred in the past, to also 
reflect the time value of money. 
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POINT V 
TO THE EXTENT PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST IS NOT ALLOWED, 
KRAATZ'S DAMAGE AWARD SHOULD BE INCREASED BY THE 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
Over eight years elapsed between the time Kraatz was wrongfully discharged and 
entry of Judgment. In that time, inflation diminished the purchasing power of United States 
currency by 20.09%. [See Consumer Price Index-Urban "CPI-U" as of 3/17/00 in R. 
4606, and the applicable upward adjustment percentage to be applied based upon a rise of 
28.4 points (141.3 to 169.7) in the Index.] Unless Kraatz's damages award is adjusted by 
an interest factor or the CPI-U, he will not be made whole by a current judgment based 
on 1992 dollars. In the intervening years, Heritage has had the use and enjoyment of 
money that rightfully should have been paid to Kraatz long ago. Thus Heritage will have 
been unjustly enriched at Kraatz's substantial expense, absent an upward adjustment of the 
final award. 
InLawv. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 185F.R.D. 324 (D. Kan. 1999), 
the federal district court ruled that where pre-judgment interest was not allowable, the 
plaintiffs "should receive damages which compensate not merely for the fact of 
nonpayment but also for any demonstrated loss of purchasing power which has resulted 
from the delay in payment." Id. at 347. Thus the court allowed a CPI adjustment of the 
damage award. In this case, a CPI adjustment can be easily calculated on any component 
of Kraatz's damages claims, which is not allowed to bear pre-judgment interest at the legal 
rate of 10% per annum. To do so will merely be a recognition of the indisputable fact that 
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a dollar today does not have the same purchasing power that it did in September of 1992, 
when Kraatz was wrongfully discharged and should have received the amounts to which 
he was entitled under the Employment Agreement. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF 
There is no support in the law or reasonable support in the evidence for the trial 
court's refusal to award Kraatz any consequential damages at all, or limit his recovery for 
unpaid lost stock appreciation rights by finding the value of 100% of Heritage's stock to 
be only $3.1 million. This case should be remanded with instructions to the trial court to 
increase the damages awarded Kraatz as follows: 
Item 
Stock Appreciation Rights 
401-k Contributions 
Christmas Bonus 
Warranty Income 
Unreimbursed Health Cjre Costs 
Profit Bonus 
St. George Home Reimbursement 
Country Club Membership 
Sports Mall Membership 
Jazz Tickets 
Costs and Expenses (other than 
expert witness fees) 
Expert Witness Fees 
Base Salary 
Annual Fixed Bonus 
Demonstrator Auto 
Attorney Fees 
Original 
Award 
$90,00.00 
16,994.11 
< 46,082.28 > 
29,155.16 
35,502.09 
35,255.70 
12,000.00 
15,951.03 
432,941.36 
Increase 
$195,000.00 
8,109.04 
1,500.00 
119,856.51 
3,484.26 
72,976.62 
2,210.53 
10,863.00 
6,187.50 
18,898.50 
9,369.90 
12,684.17 
Total 
Award 
$285,000.00 
8,109.04 
1,500.00 
119,856.51 
20,478.37 
26,894.34 
2,210.53 
10,863.00 
6,187.50 
18,898.50 
38,525.05 
48,186.26 
35,255.70 
12,000.00 
15,951.03 
432,941.36 
total damage award under the Contract in the principal amount of $1,082,857.20. 
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In addition, this Court should instruct the trial court to augment the judgment by 
awarding pre-judgment interest on all of Kraatz's damages above, as an additional element 
of Kraatz's consequential damages, or in the alternative, to increase the award by the 
Consumer Price Index-Urban (20.09%). 
Also, under the Contract Kraatz should be awarded his costs, expenses, and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred on this appeal, in amounts to be determined by the trial 
court. 
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